Friday, October 13, 2017
"A camel makes an elephant feel like a jet plane." - Jackie Kennedy
This is our last full day in Seattle; we'll leave at 6 a.m. tomorrow. The plan (it's still mid-morning) is to have lunch with my folks and say goodby then. We'll spend the rest of the day with our kids and grands and then say goodby at bedtime because they will be asleep when we leave. Because I'm preaching Sunday I want to be home early tomorrow afternoon so regroup for the effort.
It's been a GREAT visit beginning with the kids showing up on Baker Rd. and continuing here. Jason has been sick with what *may* be strep throat for the last three days and that's put a crimp on their activities but the time together has been wonderful.
Let's try something and see where it leads. Let's assume two cases similar but different in some specifics.
In Case A the rich and famous man drew younger women into his circle and used drugs to incapacitate them so he could have sex with them.
In Case B another rich and famous man drew younger women into his circle and promised them the professional advancement he could make happen if they would agree to sexual activity with him. A large number agreed.
Let's assume for the sake of discussion that in Case A there are no mitigating circumstances (I can't imagine what they would be) and that in Case B there was no forceable action or the drugs used in the other case. Case B involved the promise, real or imagined, of advantage for the woman in her chosen field.
Are the cases substantially different? Does the man in Case A bear greater culpability than the man in Case B?
It seems to me they are very different in one key sense. In Case A we have true victims who had no way to refuse because they were drugged. Their self-determination was taken away by the drugs given to them without their knowledge or consent. In Case B the women could have said no, could have left the room without harm. They were presented with an option, a quid pro quo. They traded sexual activity for career advantages, a trade they knowingly and willingly made.
That is, the women in the second case decided the unwanted sexual activity was a price they were willing to pay for the benefit it brought. Let's grant that professional success would not, could not happen any other way (though I can't imagine this was the only way forward). That doesn't change the equation. They always had the option of becoming pharmacists, or school teachers, or working in regional theaters. Yes, those options would not have brought the fame or the fortune, but it doesn't change the fact they engaged in a transaction with full knowledge of the cost/benefit dynamic.
This may be heresy to even ask, but what's the difference between Case B and prostitution? In each case there was a transaction between knowing participants. I am NOT saying either is good; they are both BAD, wrong, immoral, and as it turns out, criminal. But I'm struggling to understand why the women in Case B are victims. Case A was non-consensual, a whole different situation. If two people agree to a quid pro quo where is the victimization?
Am I a boor (or worse) for even pondering this? Am I missing some overriding part of the dynamic?
Enlighten me.
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